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Abstract
The article argues that three events presently shaping the consciousness of British people - the 
2016 Brexit referendum and its continuing fallout, the fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017, and 
the ‘Windrush Scandal’ of 2018 - derive from closely related sources deep in the foundations of 
British political culture, one (of many) source being contempt by the British ruling class for the 
working class and migrants (especially Muslims).  The three events raise key issues about the 
nature of home and post-home in an age of high migration including forced migration. The cries 
“Go Home” uttered on both sides of the Atlantic reveal a deep lack of understanding about what 
home means. Using the terms mooring, un-mooring, and re-mooring, we ask other questions. 
Where and what is home? Where and what is home for migrants and refugees? Who has what 
roles in enabling the housing of those who have been expelled from home (by fire, war, or politico-
economic processes)? How much of the hostility in the UK towards migrants and towards Europe 
derives from feelings of being dispossessed? How much from nostalgia for lost empire? Has 
hostility driven out hospitality? To what extent has the extreme political right been responsible for 
the fracturing both of British society and home itself? How might we resist?
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Brexit, Grenfell, Windrush, and the mooring, un-mooring, 
and re-mooring of home
Preface
This article argues that three events that have dominated the UK over sev-
eral years – the 2016 Brexit referendum and its subsequent fallout, the fire 
at Grenfell Tower in June 2017 and the ‘Windrush Scandal’ of 2018 (several 
decades in the making and continuing as this article is being written) – de-
rive, in part, from closely related sources deep in the foundations of British 
political culture.1
When looking for a frame to explore the connections between the three 
events, we find many factors at work. Some of these are linked to geopoliti-
cal movements at a global level. Others are regional and/or local. There are 
political, economic and socio-cultural strands too. We may look for one par-
ticular cultural strand with which to start the article. Ryszard Kapuściński 
(2018) argues that the relationship between ‘us and them’, selves and others, 
are always and everywhere characterised by either contempt and hatred, on 
the one hand, or exchange of knowledge on the other. Kenan Malik (2019) 
develops Kapuściński’s insight for the British setting thus: ‘Officials eyeing 
you with contempt. Police treating you as scum. […] Such is likely to be your 
experience if you are working class. Such is also likely to be your experience 
if you are of black or minority ethnic origin’. 
The present article builds on these two observations to suggest that 
one feature of the discourse associated with Brexit, Grenfell and Windrush 
deployed by the British ruling class and its political bag carriers is, indeed, 
contempt for the working class and migrants. Nigel Farage’s ‘Breaking point’ 
poster (see Figure 2) appeared at a key moment in the Brexit process while 
Boris Johnson’s recurring slurs – such as his linking of the burqa with post-
1 The Brexit referendum or the ‘United Kingdom European Union member-
ship referendum’ took place on 23 June 2016 in the UK and Gibraltar, asking 
whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union (EU citizens 
and the British Overseas Territories Citizens beyond the UK and Gibraltar 
were ineligible to vote). Grenfell Tower is a twenty-four-story tower block in 
West London that suffered a catastrophic fire in June 2017, which killed at 
least seventy-two of its inhabitants. The ‘Windrush Scandal’, per se, broke in 
2018 and consisted of popular outrage about the deportation to the Caribbean 
of hundreds of people of Afro-Caribbean heritage who had lived much of their 
life in Britain. Deportation of so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ was being carried 
out well before the ‘Windrush scandal’ itself and is, shamefully, proceeding 
apace at the time of writing (2019).
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boxes and bank robbers – pop up routinely. As for the British working class, 
the ideological principles of the five authors of the tragi-comic manifesto of 
an extreme rightist clique – the conservative politicians Kwasi Kwarteng, 
Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore and Elizabeth Truss – is clear. 
They begin chapter four of their book, Britannia Unchained, by claiming: 
‘Once they enter the workplace, the British are among the worst idlers in the 
world’ (2012: 61). Their response to this is to imagine a Britain unregulated 
by social considerations, free to pursue a ‘buccaneering’ mode of being, ‘get-
ting on the side of the responsible, the hard working and the brave. We must 
stop’, they add, ‘bailing out the reckless, avoiding all risk, and rewarding lazi-
ness’ (ibid.: 112).  
The ‘othering’ of immigrants, refugees, and the working class is achieved 
partly by the distribution to the British people of powerful mythologies (to 
be defined and explored below). The article thus considers actions, ideas and 
values of those involved in producing and reproducing the politics of oth-
ering, one assumption being that such complex political notions as ‘Will of 
the People’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’ (and the latest at the time of writ-
ing, ‘liberty’) are being spread around as myth themes rather than subjects 
of sober thought. It follows that, colloquially put, we can see the Britain of 
Brexit, Grenfell, and Windrush being led, Pied Piper-like, towards a political 
and cultural space in which the realities of austerity and de-regulation on 
the ground2 have simultaneously been both orchestrated and shrouded from 
view by economic interests articulated by a political class making sizeable fi-
nancial gains at the same time as wielding technologically-charged mytholo-
gies that have been lying dormant since the 1930s. 
We are, to put it in a slightly different way, in Fintan O’Toole (2018) ter-
ritory where pleasure and pain (‘heroic failure’ as he puts it) co-exist in a 
political field into which we have all been invited to experience an ecstasy of 
humiliation promising to achieve the reclamation of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘inde-
pendence’ through obeisance to the ‘Will of the People’ at a time when the ac-
tual means of democratic renewal have all but been stripped bare (see below). 
The implications of all this for our understanding of the meanings of home, 
homecoming and home making in a post-home world underpin everything 
that follows. 
Introduction 
Issues of home and ‘post-home’ are integral to this article, the terms being 
at the centre of all three of our events. The Brexit process has raised pro-
2 A parliamentary report records that The Food Foundation estimates that 1.97 
million people within the UK may be undernourished. The British Associa-
tion for Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition (BAPEN) places the number of mal-
nourished, specifically undernourished, people at 3 million (House of Com-
mons Environmental Audit Committee 2019). 
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found questions about the extent to which the British are at home in Europe 
(as many banners at recent pro-European demonstrations have proclaimed) 
and/or Europeans are (still) at home in Britain. The fire at Grenfell Tower 
destroyed all the homes of those living there and has raised many questions 
about how those made homeless have subsequently been looked after and 
enabled to find new homes. The ‘Windrush scandal’ started out as the so-
called ‘hostile environment’ project activated by the then Home Secretary in 
2012.3  This programme sought to persuade people who came to the UK from 
the Caribbean in the ‘Empire Windrush’ to ‘go home’ if they lacked official 
papers dating from the time of their arrival. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. Part 1 (Displacement) itself has 
four sections. The first and second of these sections consider the present state 
of the anthropology of home, discusses the notions of ‘un-mooring, moor-
ing and re-mooring’ in defining home in an age of migration and refugees, 
and looks at the definition of ‘hostile environment’. The third section reflects 
on the extent to which local democratic processes have been shattered by 
austerity while the fourth speculates about the senses in which citizens may 
feel ‘intellectually displaced’ in a post-imperial Britain. Part 2 (Architects 
of Brexit) looks at the individuals, groups, networks and ideas leading the 
Brexit project and describes the aims and objectives of its architects. High on 
the list of these aims are visions of a British political economy built upon the 
most extreme principles of individualism, social fragmentation and deregu-
lation, linked closely to a rising anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric. 
Part 3 (Mythologies) briefly identifies a selection of ‘mythologies’ – in the 
Barthian sense4 – attached to the three events. Part 4 (Resistance) sketches 
ways in which the politics and practices of resistance to all of the above are 
presently being fashioned and enacted. Reference to our three events will be 
made throughout. 
Part 1: Displacement
Inspired by the arrival in London docks of HMT Empire Windrush in 1948 
(see Figure 1), and the practical and theoretical connotations of displacement 
accompanying the ship, we build our analysis around the notions of mooring, 
un-mooring and re-mooring of homes. These nautical metaphors are all too 
appropriate in a world shaped by seascapes which are nowadays full of small, 
often unseaworthy, boats carrying refugees attempting to cross into Europe 
3 Part of this project is the ‘Immigration Act 2014’ (see Home Office 2014).
4 The term ‘mythologies’ in this article follows the work of Roland Barthes (1991 
[1957]) and his studies of French iconographic objects, actions and ideas – 
such as the Blue Guide, ornamental cookery, the Eiffel Tower, and so on. One 
essential aspect of his approach is to show how these ‘mythologies’ simulta-
neously highlight particular cultural ‘ways of seeing’ whilst obscuring crucial 
material features of the objects.  
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from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean in search of good 
and settled lives in new homes. 
Fig. 1. HMT Empire Windrush. © IWM (FL 9448).
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205120767
The terms mooring, un-mooring, and re-mooring express well where we have 
reached in the field of anthropology of home. In a recent co-edited volume 
on home (Frost and Selwyn 2018), I have argued that contemporary anthro-
pological work on the idea of home has been shaped by several discernible 
features (Selwyn 2018). Firstly, the field is increasingly being framed within 
a ‘world systems’ jigsaw in which, for example, ‘the life of an asylum seeker 
in Sydney is inexorably linked to conflict and war in the Spice Islands of east-
ern Indonesia’ (ibid.: 170). Secondly, ideas about home are inseparable from 
questions of identity and the formation of the self. Thirdly, anthropological 
work on homemaking has become closely related to analyses of the symbol-
ism of material objects, including the human body. Fourthly, the anthropol-
ogy of home combines studies of space, identity and the role of civil society 
and the state in a fragmented and fragmenting world.   
Displacement I: home moored, un-moored and re-moored
Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing (2007) have correctly observed that, al-
though home is a ‘key term’ in anthropology, not a great deal of theoretical 
use has been made of it over and above its application to the term house. For 
us, however, the notion of a moored house allows us to understand how a 
house becomes a home in large measure by being attached to ways of being 
and doing both within and beyond its doors. Homes are intimately related to 
places of work, sources of food, to medicine, worship, leisure, familiar and 
familial spaces, transport and so on, and are, in that sense, moored with-
in larger social, economic, political and cultural circles of ideas, places and 
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practices. Equally clearly, homes become ‘un-moored’ by war and forced mi-
gration. Refugees, by definition, are searching for new moorings. 
Ethnographic analysis of the re-mooring of homes to new and re-shaped 
systems and structures in contemporary Britain (or, indeed, anywhere else) 
challenges anthropological approaches in several ways, two of which may be 
emphasised here. To start with, the spatialities of mooring are complex. Mak-
ing a home involves constructing, affirming and re-affirming relationships at 
social and geographical levels ranging from the domestic to the global as well 
as the many points in between – within urban or regional communities and 
networks, for example. Secondly, such construction involves making a large 
number of institutional relationships - from health professionals to diaspora 
groups, from religious sites to sites of leisure and enjoyment, and so on. So-
cial processes involved in mooring and homemaking are thus also complex 
and multi-layered. The challenge lies in the analytical capacity to draw to-
gether the threads (social, cultural, political, economic) into a coherent and 
intelligible whole.
One reason why the anthropological usage of the idea of home has been 
uneven and theoretically marginal is that the term has been used in two dif-
ferent and seemingly contradictory ways (Frost and Selwyn 2018: 5). On the 
one hand, there is Mary Douglas’s (1991) claim that home is to be under-
stood in terms of the routinisation of time and space, and thus of ‘patterns 
of regular doings, furnishings, and appurtenances’ (ibid.: 289). On the oth-
er hand, Rapport and Overing (ibid.: 176) have argued that, in a globalised 
world shaped by migration, the term home must address the fact of people’s 
multiple attachments to different places. The crochet-like patterns of senses 
of identity that accompany these attachments speak precisely of a lack of rou-
tinisation. In such a world, they argue, Douglas’s approach is ‘anachronistic, 
providing little conceptual purchase in a world of contemporary movement’ 
(ibid.). Frost and I argue that the ideas of home and homemaking in a world 
of migrants necessarily require the insights of both Douglas and Rapport 
and Overing (see Frost and Selwyn 2018). 
The notion of home à la Douglas connotes the space/house/dwelling 
place of individuals and the intimate collectivities of which they are a part: 
couples, families, friendship groups and so on (Palmer 2018). A classic ethno-
graphic description and analysis of such a dwelling is Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979 
[1970]) exquisite ‘The Kabyle House or the World Reversed’, a work much 
admired by Douglas herself and incorporated in her own edited collection 
Rules and Meanings (1973). In his essay, Bourdieu (1979 [1970]) describes fa-
milial structures and processes in a Kabyle house: birth, death, marriage, the 
raising of children, food production, animal husbandry and so on: in short, 
the temporal and spatial rhythms of home. 
Shifting our gaze from Bourdieu’s ‘house’ towards our contemporary 
world of migration and movement from north Africa to Europe reveals a fea-
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ture of the socio-cultural landscape that has precise relevance for the present 
article. Kabyle people have a long history of migration to France and else-
where in Europe, migrating there in waves from 1913 onwards. At the time 
of writing this (July 2019) a number of web-based platforms of interest to 
the Kabyle diaspora can be found. For example, ‘Algérie Mariage/Charmes 
d’Orient’ is an enterprise based in Lyon, France, offering Kabyle style fashion 
items for weddings, while Walimation Production Company offers wedding 
music clips such as ‘Alilou – Vive les Mariés’.5 The site is linked to Facebook 
comments by members of the diaspora about Kabyle identity in Europe.
Web-based platforms like these and others are best interpreted as quin-
tessentially homemaking agencies. As noted above, the sites tend to be linked 
to opportunities to comment on what it means to be a north African immi-
grant in France and are often linked up to support groups of various kinds 
providing services for incoming migrant families engaged in re-mooring 
homes in France, whilst also maintaining close links with homes in north Af-
rica. They also remind us, yet again, that home making in our present world 
tends for many to be an enterprise that occurs on a variety of levels, from the 
intimate and domestic to the regional and global. In making the journeys 
from ‘La Maison Kabyle’ to and from ‘Algérie Mariage/Charmes d’Orient’ – 
effectively, from Douglas to Rapport/Overing and back again – what we see 
are processes of un-mooring and re-mooring of homes. Our task, as anthro-
pologists of home, is to trace the complex forms these processes take.    
Displacement II: the ‘hostile environment’ towards refugees, asylum seek-
ers and ‘illegal immigrants’ 
The title of the iconic image of the 2016 campaign to leave the EU was 
‘Breaking Point’ (see Figure 2). This consisted of a photograph of a long line 
of young male Muslim refugees in the Balkans walking towards the camera 
(see Heather and Mason 2016). The image, greatly magnified, was placed on 
the side of a van which was wheeled out into public view on the day that the 
former Labour MP Jo Cox was murdered. Cox’s views on the need to stay 
within the EU and to defend immigration were well known. Her murderer, 
a neo-Nazi, Thomas Mair, shouted ‘Britain first’ and ‘keep Britain independ-
ent’ as he shot and stabbed her (see Cobain, Parveen and Taylor 2016). Asked 
to state his name at the trial, he said that it is ‘death to traitors, freedom 
for Britain’ (see Booth et al. 2016). During the trial Mair was shown to have 
multiple links with far-right political groups. The ‘Breaking Point’ van was 
reproduced in the media together with a photograph of Farage, then Head of 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), positioned in front of the 
5 See Algérie Mariage/Charmes d’Orient at http://www.algerie-mariage.net/
item/charmes-dorient/ and Walimation Production’s ‘Alilou - Vive les Mariés’ 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3dCJDdXUbs [both accessed 22nd 
June 2019].
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van, pointing towards the text written across the picture of the refugees. This 
read: ‘The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back 
control of our borders. Leave the European Union on 23rd June’. Likewise, 
the UKIP ‘Brexit battle bus’ toured with a sign ‘We want our country back’ 
(see Figure 5). 
Fig. 2. The ‘Breaking Point’ poster, as it appeared in one of Nigel Farage’s messages
on Twitter, June 2016. Photo: © @Nigel_Farage. 
The explosive entry of refugees into the centre of the debate about Britain’s 
relationship to the EU built upon rhetoric that been established some years 
earlier by the then Home Secretary, Theresa May. In 2012, May promoted 
what became known as the ‘Hostile Environment’ policy, which she and the 
British Home Office named ‘Operation Vaken’.6 This was a programme based 
6 Simon Hattenstone (2018) drew attention to the fact that the programme 
was termed ‘Vaken’ and that this term derived from the slogan Deutschland 
Erwache (‘Germany Awake’). This programme, which, according to Hatten-
stone, was the only British Home Office policy ever to have been given a title 
in a language other than English, was emblazoned on banners flown at the 
Nuremberg rallies held annually in Germany between 1923 and 1938 by the 
Nazi Party. Amongst the many films made to commemorate the rallies, one 
in particular seems relevant to the present article, namely Leni Riefenstahl’s 
Triumph of the Will (1935). 
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on the promise by the Conservative Party, enshrined in its manifesto, to ‘get 
immigration down to the tens of thousands’. It was to be achieved partly by 
a programme of deportation of residents in the UK who were unable (often 
through no fault of theirs) to produce papers the Home Office decided le-
gitimated their residence and/or citizenship in Britain. May referred to such 
people with the blanket term ‘illegal immigrants’ or, as she put it at the 2016 
Conservative party conference ‘citizens of nowhere’.7 In the case of Vaken, a 
magnified image of handcuffs and three textual messages were spread out 
on the side of vans. ‘In the UK illegally?’ asked one message; ‘106 arrests 
last week’ announced a second; ‘Go home or face arrest’ said a third. These 
inscriptions suggested that at the heart of May’s enterprise was an attempt 
to shape the way we think about ideas of home and homemaking. The repro-
duction in the British press of the texts on the Vaken vans steered us not only 
towards determining who amongst us should be invited home and who kept 
out, but also towards going along with the implication that it was somehow 
‘normal’ to be attached to a single home and a singular identity. Vaken tar-
geted all who were assumed (before any due process) to be sans papiers but 
was arguably felt most strongly by people of Afro-Caribbean heritage living 
in Britain. 
It is out of Vaken that the Windrush scandal grew. The troop-carrying 
ship HMT Empire Windrush8 docked in London in 1948 with 1,029 passen-
gers from Jamaica. Of these, nearly seven hundred came from the Caribbean 
with the intention of settling in the UK. These and others who arrived at the 
same time are referred to as the ‘Windrush generation’. When, at the time 
of the scandal, it became widely known how this group of people, invited as 
they had been by the British government to contribute to the post-war re-
building of the UK, had been so crassly and belligerently targeted since 2012, 
there were many voices raised in outrage. Despite these voices and the resig-
nation of Amber Rudd, then Home Secretary, officially generated hostility is 
still in full swing. Home Office (Home Office, 2018) statistics record that in 
the year ending September 2018 10,190 immigrants were forcibly deported 
(slightly less than in the previous year) while 2049 were held in detention. Di-
ane Taylor (2018) has written that conditions in detention centres are worse 
than in prison. 
7 Theresa May’s speech included the following: ‘Today, too many people in po-
sitions of power behave as though they have more in common with interna-
tional elites than with the people down the road, the people they employ, the 
people they pass on the street. But if you believe you are a citizen of the world, 
you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means’ 
(see Davis and Hollis 2018).
8 The original name of HMT Empire Windrush was MV Monte Rosa. This was 
a passenger ship launched in Germany in the 1930s and used by the Nazis in 
World War II to deport Jews from Norway to the concentration camps in Po-
land. 
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David Lammy has been one of the most vocal MPs on the plight of the 
Windrush generation, including the children of Windrush families. He has 
stressed the close relationship between Vaken and the appeasement by the 
Conservative party of its extreme right wing and its UKIP shadows (see Lam-
my 2018). During the Windrush debate, Lammy stressed the long relation-
ship (since the first British ships arrived in the Caribbean in 1623), shaped by 
slavery and colonisation as it was, between Britain and the Caribbean (ibid.). 
He pointed out that 25,000 people with Caribbean origins had served in the 
first and second world wars. He ended his speech declaring: 
This is a day of national shame, and it has come about because 
of a ‘hostile environment’. Let us call it as it is: if you lay down 
with dogs, you get fleas, and that is what has happened with the 
far-right rhetoric in this country. (ibid.)
Despite being an active and visible member of the Anglican church,9 May 
has followed others in the use of the sort of far-right language that has found 
its way into the hearts of Windrush (and Brexit) related speech. She herself 
built on rhetorical declarations previously made by members of her own 
party about immigrants. David Cameron had referred to a ‘swarm of peo-
ple coming across the Mediterranean’ trying to ‘break into Britain without 
permission’ (Elgot 2016), whilst Philip Hammond had spoken of ‘maraud-
ing’ African migrants (Perraudin 2015). May herself spoke of asylum seekers 
as ‘foreign criminals’ (Chakrabortty 2017). Indeed, aided by these and other 
such terms,10 characteristic as they are of the rhetoric of UKIP, May has done 
much to encourage a spirit of intolerance amongst the general public towards 
refugees and migrants more generally. It comes as no surprise that the Ox-
ford University Study of Migration (Allen, 2016) found that, in the decade 
before its publication, the most common word used in the British press in 
conjunction with migrant or immigrant was ‘illegal’. The linguistic elision 
between migrant and illegal has underscored the routine holding of asylum 
seekers, without prior due process, in detention centres and/or in accommo-
dation often unfit for human habitation run by private companies in receipt 
of public funds.11
9 A majority of those presenting as members of the Anglican Church voted to 
leave the EU (cf. Smith and Woodhead (2018).
10 When measured by criteria suggested by this article, the boundary between 
the Europhobic right wing of the Conservative Party and the extreme right 
(Farage and beyond) appears highly permeable.     
11 Clearsprings Ready Homes is one example. This is a property group that is 
paid substantial sums of public money to provide accommodation for asylum 
seekers in London and the South-East. The quality and maintenance stand-
ards of the properties managed by the company are reported to be very poor 
(see Williams 2016). 
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May’s ‘hostile environment’ vans, their frightening images and texts with 
their implied messages, were archetypical examples of the ‘relentless tar-
geting of hyper-partisan views’ which the parliamentary committee of the 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport later defined as ‘fake news’ (DCMS 2018). 
‘Fake news’ is fed by a particularly toxic fertiliser in which one set of ‘facts’ 
grows into others in seamless elaborations: hostility towards refugees into 
hostility towards the EU into hostility towards the ‘Westminster élite’, and 
so on. Such flowing inseparability is precisely what UKIP and its Brexiteer 
associates placed at the centre of their efforts to summon the Brexit votes. 
Nigel Oakes, one of the founders of Cambridge Analytica, in and out bedfel-
low of Farage and his followers (see Doward and Gibbs 2017), described his 
profiling work in a 1992 interview: ‘We use the same techniques as Aristotle 
and Hitler. We appeal to people on an emotional level to get them to agree on 
a functional level’ (Robinson 2018). 
Displacement III: austerity, urban displacement and the theft of local de-
mocracy 
The policies and rhetoric indicated above have targeted people who have 
been displaced from their homes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, parts 
of sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, and who have made their way to the 
UK to make their homes in Britain. We will return to this aspect of the 
theme of displacement in part two of this article. Before that, however, we 
may consider the theme of displacement from another point of view, namely 
that which relates to feelings of being displaced from one’s own hometown 
and even the displacement of the town itself. In his conspectus of the effect 
on local municipal life and governance of ‘austerity’, Tom Crewe (2016) has 
described what he terms ‘the strange death of municipal England’. We may 
follow Crewe’s lead by referring to a variety of journalistic reports and ethno-
graphic evidence as follows.
Recently made redundant from the closing of the Goodyear factory in 
Wolverhampton, one of the people interviewed by Jim O’Neil (2017) in the 
BBC’s ‘Fixing Globalisation’ series explained the background of his city’s vote 
to leave the EU with brutal simplicity: 
All I have known, in 38 years of working in this country – all 
my working life – is short-time working, recessions, people los-
ing their jobs, factory after factory closing. [...] This region has 
been stripped down and taken abroad [...] People voted Brexit as 
a protest vote. (ibid. emphasis mine) 
He went on to describe the food banks in the town, the homeless and ‘people 
queuing up 60-deep outside Citizens Advice worrying about bailiffs’, con-
cluding: ‘This is my town, and we’ve got to do something about it’ (ibid.). His 
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words expressed feelings, not only of despair about what he perceived to be 
a socially fragmenting and directionless post-industrial economy, but also of 
deep sadness about the deterioration of social life in his hometown. 
O’Neil’s interlocutor spoke of the displacement both of himself and of 
his home town. His words fit with accounts of the ways that urban spaces, as 
centres for the gathering of familiars and generators of social solidarity all 
over Britain, have been closed off, shut down, and/or sold off. There are many 
examples. Tim Coates (2018) has written of the closure of public libraries and 
the laying off of library staff. The Sutton Trust (see Smith et al. 2018) has 
documented the systematic closure of Sure Start children’s centres. This has 
left the UK’s flagship early years programme ‘hollowed out’ and in decline 
(ibid. 5). Local municipalities throughout Britain have been selling off public 
land under their control in order to fund their services in the face of relentless 
reductions from central government. Brent Council, for example, has sold off 
public space it formally controlled, worth thirty million sterling over the past 
five years for this reason (see Shaw 2019). Most recently, in 2018 and 2019, 
Brent found itself in the High Court, fighting to confirm its power to acquire a 
fully operating centre for the Afro-Caribbean community, the Bridge Centre 
(see Taylor 2019). Brent’s plan was, and remains at the time of writing, to shut 
down the centre, demolish the building, clear the land, and build apartments 
in order to sell these off in order to make up its budget from the depredations 
that the government’s austerity programme has visited on it.
A report based on a collaborative, cross-country investigation led by re-
porters from the Huffington Post (see Davies et al. 2019) has reported on the 
extent to which the cities in the UK’s North East have been stripped of fund-
ing and, consequently, forced to sell large amounts of public land and proper-
ty, and cut services to the bone. The report has revealed that several councils 
in the North East have axed housing support services, including hostel beds, 
refuges and sheltered housing, as they struggle to meet the demands of fresh 
rounds of cuts. 
In Sunderland, for example, the housing support budget for homeless 
people in the city is being cut to zero. The Salvation Army, which runs a lo-
cal hostel, has said that the council faced hard decisions: ‘They have closed 
libraries and children’s centres and they are now having to look at cutting 
support to the most vulnerable people’ (Butler and Laville 2017). Sunderland 
council has stated ‘Because of budget cuts and the government’s austerity 
programme, the council is reviewing and remodelling many services’ (ibid.). 
Sunderland voted Leave by a substantial majority in the 2016 referendum 
and was the starting point of Farage’s ‘sort of march’ (his words). The Council 
has signalled the imminent closure of Centrepoint, a homelessness charity 
for young people, following the withdrawal of all council funds. Four hostels 
for vulnerable young people will close in 2017. Furthermore, with £568,000 
Selwyn         Brexit, Grenfell, Windrush
136
budget cut, the voluntary society ‘Wearside Women in Need’, which runs ref-
uges and a helpline will close (Dawn 2017).
In Birmingham, voluntary organisations wrote to Theresa May in 2017, 
arguing that it was likely vulnerable people would die as a direct result of 
the proposed £10 million cuts over two years to services for homeless and 
mentally ill people.12 A couple of months before this letter, Chiriac Inout, a 
homeless man, was found dead near a car park in Birmingham city centre in 
temperatures of minus 6C (see Cartledge 2016). 
In Norfolk, charities have said £5m cuts to housing support services 
(equivalent to around 55% of the total funding for such services) proposed by 
Norfolk county council from April 2017 will drive up homelessness in Nor-
wich, which is already reporting record numbers of people sleeping rough on 
the streets (Butler and Laville 2017). The Norwich city council leader, Alan 
Waters, described the combination of reductions to the council’s budget, the 
rising rents and the welfare cuts as a ‘perfect storm’. According to the Local 
Government Association, local authorities have a 40% real-terms reduction 
to their core government grant over the past 10 years and are facing more 
cuts every year (ibid.). Across the country, other local authorities are in the 
same position: facing huge budget cuts and deciding whether to continue to 
cut funding for services into non-existence. What’s happening in Sunderland, 
Bristol, Norwich, Birmingham and elsewhere in the UK is about to happen in 
the rest of the country.
Crewe’s ‘death of municipal England’ has involved the fracturing of pub-
lic spaces and the fragmenting of public services. As O’Neil’s (2017) inter-
locutor in Wolverhampton implied with forceful precision, these processes 
resulted, inter alia, in the current disillusion with politics, governance, and 
(crucially in our case here) the EU. Many would argue, however, that the EU 
is the wrong address. Austerity is the child of the Conservative government 
rather than the EU.  
There are further aspects to this fracturing, one of which has to do with 
the ‘de-democratisation’ of local government by Tony Blair’s first govern-
ment. I will quote, more or less verbatim, from my colleague, Alan Temple-
ton.13 According to Templeton, in a drive for local efficiency, Blair’s ‘Local 
Government Act 2000’ required local municipalities to change their tradi-
tional committee-based system of decision making into an executive model 
(see Home Office 2000). One form of this consisted of a council having a 
leader supported by a cabinet executive. Backbench councillors were granted 
12 See the full letter sent by the Birmingham volunteer organisations to Theresa 
May here: https://birminghammind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/The-
resaMayLetterFINALVERSIONJan17.pdf (accessed 20 July 2019). 
13 I am indebted to Templeton, Chair of Camden Public Libraries User’s Group 
(CPLUG) for this analysis. As noted, I quote him almost verbatim in the para-
graphs that follow as well as using his words (‘theft of local democracy’) in the 
title of this sub-section. 
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a scrutiny role but in a way that lessened their power when compared to their 
situation in their former committee-based structures of governance. Accord-
ing to Templeton (see notes 12 and 13), this was a system copied from the one 
operating in the national parliament. However, unlike their national coun-
terparts, councillor members of local scrutiny committees enjoy little or no 
support structures (research capacity, training, access to specialist advice, 
for example). At the local level, the scrutiny committees have part time coun-
cillors with no research and little independent specialist advice available. As 
a result, power has been taken away from the council as a whole and given 
to the cabinet without any effective oversight. Moreover, executive members 
of the cabinet are also part timers without independent research and ad-
vice. This clearly renders them less able to work with their council officer 
colleagues with any sense of equality. In short, much of the power wielded by 
councillors in the traditional form of local government has been transferred 
to unelected officers. As the price of making municipalities ‘more efficient’ 
in the sense of being more amenable to national edicts, local democracy has 
obviously been weakened.14 
Displacement IV: nostalgic memorialisation – temporal and spatial dis-
placement 
Following research by Danny Dorling (2018) and Lorenza Antonucci et al. 
(2017), Gurminder Bhambra (2018) has drawn attention to the fact that it was 
the ‘squeezed middle’, that is to say ‘propertied, pensioned, educated, white, 
southern English middle-class voters uncomfortable with their declining 
economic position’, as she puts it, rather than poor and angry working-class 
voters (and still less BME voters who overwhelmingly voted ‘Remain’) who 
made the statistical running in voting ‘Leave’. Noting that prominent slogans 
before and after the referendum have included ‘we want our country back’ 
and ‘we are voting for our sovereignty’, Bhambra (ibid.) argues that, amongst 
the ‘squeezed middle’, the main motivation for supporting Brexit was a dis-
placed reaction to the implications for national identity caused by the loss, 
from 1948 onwards, of the British Empire. 
Bhambra’s (ibid.) argument has three interrelated strands. The first is 
that, as rulers of a multi-cultural empire, the British felt themselves to have 
global status. Secondly, although this sense of global status continued to be 
felt when the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, 
it was a feeling that became tinged with resentment: now Britain was only 
one amongst 28 nations and thus primus inter pares rather than ruler of the 
14 Templeton points out a fascinating twist to this narrative of the decline of 
local democracy, namely that the Cameron government’s ‘Localism Act 2011’ 
made it possible for larger councils to revert to the traditional local authority 
method of operation provided a locality had a population greater than 85,000 
(see also Home Office 2011). 
Selwyn         Brexit, Grenfell, Windrush
138
roost. Thus, thirdly, when the multi-cultural inhabitants of the former em-
pire began to ‘come home’, the sense of resentment grew. Islamophobia and 
racist dispositions towards Eastern Europeans and others grew. These found 
their way into anti-European Union rhetoric and the idea not only that the 
EU was responsible for ‘illegal immigration’ but that the UK had no power to 
stop this. This sense of powerlessness has been inflamed by the buffoonery 
of ‘vassal state’ utterances by Johnson, Jacob Rees-Mogg, Farage and other 
leading ‘bastards’ or ‘bad boys’15 that, as Lammy (2018) has rightly said, con-
jure sightings of a darkening horizon beneath which lurk the malignant shad-
ows of Tommy Robinson and his fascist thugs. An example of this came to 
light in 2017, following the Grenfell fire. The largest single donor to the Vote 
Leave movement, Arron Banks, launched a photograph of Grenfell Tower on 
the LEAVE.EU Twitter account (see Figure 3). Across the picture was the 
text ‘An amnesty for Grenfell illegal immigrants? Absolutely not! The law is 
the law’. Next to the group’s logo was another one, of Banks’s GoSkippy.com 
insurance company. The Daily Mirror re-published Banks’s image in a double 
page spread excoriating its author and his associates. We return to the image 
in part III. 
Fig. 3. LEAVE.EU message published on Twitter on 22 June 2017, days after the Grenfell 
fire. Photo: © @LeaveEuOfficial. 
15 ‘Bastards’ was the late Prime Minister John Major’s term for Eurosceptic 
Conservative MPs, whereas ‘bad boys’ is Nigel Farage’s term for the group of 
prominent members of the UKIPery, including himself and Banks.
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When combined, these threads of British representations over the last dec-
ades and more, with their echoes and intimations of times past and future, 
offer us a complex pattern within which one dominant narrative can be dis-
cerned. This speaks of cultural introspection, progressive marginalisation of 
the idea of the social (including social responsibility) from the lexicon of the 
political right, and rising abuse and hostility to others. In present contexts 
the above paragraphs have begun to outline how this hostility has included, 
via Vaken, Windrush and, by way of local incompetence together with active 
dislike for public services in general and public housing in particular, Gren-
fell Tower itself.  
So far, we have concentrated on the ‘losers’ of the displacement process-
es we have described: the refugees and ‘illegal immigrants’ displaced from 
their homes by war; those whose home towns and cities are felt to have been 
displaced by privatisation; even those in the ‘squeezed middle’ who feel they 
have been part of a historical shift that has displaced their own country from 
the dominance it once enjoyed as ruler of an Empire. It is now time to look at 
some of the ‘winners’.   
Part 2: Architects of Brexit
The ground base of this article is that Windrush, Grenfell and Brexit derive 
from the dispositions towards the concept of society espoused by Margaret 
Thatcher and the Conservative right wing whose project, since 1979, has  in-
volved the  shrinking of the state, reduction of  taxes, de-regulation, whole-
sale privatisation and reduction of public services (including public hous-
ing and home building), demise of heavy industry and demolition of union 
strength and influence, and the radical stoking of financial services. When at 
her pomp in 1987, 8 years after her rise to power, she revealed her beliefs with 
unusual clarity. In that year, in an interview for Woman’s Own, she uttered 
her credo as follows:
I think we have gone through a period when too many children 
and people have been given to understand ‘I have a problem, it 
is the Government’s job to cope with it!’ or ‘I have a problem, I 
will go and get a grant to cope with it!’ ‘I am homeless, the Gov-
ernment must house me!’ and so they are casting their problems 
on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are 
individual men and women. (Thatcher 1987) 
Five years after this intervention, in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed 
at a time when Euroscepticism was warming to its task and a more extreme 
version of Thatcher’s project began to stir. In 2007/8 the financial crash took 
place which then led to the long and unfinished period of austerity. The ex-
treme right, anti-Europe, pro-US free trade lobby groups (see below) began 
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to circle and austerity was joined by a culture of hostility to immigrants and 
refugees (the ‘hostile environment’ appeared in 2012) together with all the 
rest of the extreme right’s by now familiar baggage. 
Brexit must have seemed like the prize of all prizes: all the aims of the 
far right could be achieved in one single blow. And the ‘people’ (as in ‘Will of 
the People’) could imagine that the project was none of the above, but rather 
the fulfilment of the seductive myth of ‘getting back control of our money, 
borders and laws’: the most perfect trompe l’oeil or, to put it another way, 
three card-trick, imaginable. All of this invites us to look closely at some of 
the leading Brexiteers, their flag wavers and their strategies. 
Donors and their affiliations 
There were at least seven well, or reasonably well-known, associations in-
volved in campaigning for Brexit, the two most conspicuous ones being Vote 
Leave, the official campaign group and Leave.EU.16 Following acrimonious 
disputes between these two, a third group, Grassroots Out, came into being 
with Peter Bone and Liam Fox (Conservative), Kate Hoey (Labour), Farage 
(UKIP) and others towing the group on its way. The complex institutional 
structures and dynamics between these groups is for another day. It needs 
noting, though, that Leave.EU has become involved in legal disputes about 
overspending and other alleged criminal activity. 
There have been several reports and journalistic interventions listing 
names of donors to the Leave campaigning groups, noting their business and 
political affiliations. What follows here is a very narrow, initial, second-hand 
and incomplete glimpse of where some of the funds for the Brexit campaign 
came from, using the report by Adam Payne and Will Martin (2017) to chart 
a path. 
Payne and Martin (ibid.) published their list of Brexit donors a year af-
ter the referendum. From Lady Annabel Goldsmith (£25,000 given to Brexit 
campaign groups) to Banks (over £8m) via the pub chain owner Tim Martin 
(£212,000) and a host of other hedge fund owners, members of the House of 
Lords, millionaire bankers, a Conservative party treasurer, the chairman/
managing director of JCB, Lord Bamford (a supporter of Johnson’s campaign 
to be Conservative Prime Minister), Payne and Martin (ibid.) have subse-
quently reported that the campaign received over £24m in donations, the 
majority of which came from the five richest businessmen in Britain. 
Payne and Martin, as well as others, have confirmed that the donors to 
the campaign groups supporting Brexit were, without exception, from the 
16 Apart from these two groups, some of the more prominent promoters of Brex-
it included Grassroots Out (a UKIP-related/Faragist entity founded by Peter 
Bone MP), Labour Leave (featuring, amongst others, John Mills and Graham 
Stringer MP), and Left Leave (a ‘Lexit’ outfit supported by the Socialist Work-
ers Party and the Communist Party). 
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political right (including the extreme right), mostly attached either to the 
right of the Conservative Party or to UKIP. Also without exception, all were 
concerned with the tax advantages to multinational corporations of leaving 
the EU and the concomitant deregulatory possibilities that Brexit presented. 
Brexit: some key ideas and values
Although written by a freelance writer without any apparent institutional 
affiliation, I have found the blog entries by Richard Hutton (2018) useful in 
steering the way towards an assessment of the political influence of the large 
variety of lobby groups active before, during, and after the Brexit referen-
dum. In what follows I give examples of some of these, basing the selection on 
a variety of sources including texts from the institutions themselves. 
As Hutton (ibid.) has said, the Brexit referendum was built on lobby-
ing by many groups starting years before the actual event. In the early days, 
the lobbyists’ aim was to transform the EU into a deregulated free-trade 
zone thus suiting the interests of British and American businesses. The lob-
by groups were dedicated to the curtailment of the EU’s financial, environ-
mental, and employment regulations within Britain, their intention being to 
withdraw Britain from the European social model and transform the coun-
try into a US-style outfit featuring minimal taxes and maximum profits for 
transnational corporations. 
Here are some examples of the groups, their personnel, and their ideas 
and values. In 2013, the group Business for Britain, was set up by Matthew 
Elliott, founder and former chief executive of the right-wing group, the Tax 
Payers’ Alliance. The group was made up of 500 professed business-leaders, 
used a number of media outlets to circulate a letter to persuade the govern-
ment to transform the EU into a ‘flexible, competitive, Europe with more 
powers devolved from Brussels’ (see Castle 2013). The letter lobbied to ‘re-
turn control over social & employment laws’ to Britain, to ‘cut the EU budget 
to save taxpayers’ money’, to ‘protect the City and financial services’, to ‘fast 
track international trade deals’ and to ensure the EU dispensed with social 
protections and employment laws. In the group’s view this would allow Brit-
ain to be transformed into a free-market zone. It saw the demon principle of 
the EU as the ‘Social Chapter’ of the Maastricht Treaty. BforB lobbying was 
supported by the Telegraph Group (The Daily Telegraph, along with the Daily 
Express and the Daily Mail constitute the main Brexit supporting newspa-
pers in the UK). Elliott (2016) himself explained that he founded BforB ‘to 
bring together business leaders who supported a referendum and a funda-
mental change in our relationship with the EU’. The group produced a pam-
phlet (which it regarded as its magnum opus) entitled ‘Change or Go’ and 
morphed into Brexit Central in 2016. It is important to add that Elliott had 
co-launched the Tax Payers’ Alliance (TPA) in 2004, a lobby group dedicated 
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to the reduction of the size of government, and lower government spending. 
According to Evans et al. (2018), the TPA received £223 worth of foreign (in-
cluding Russian) donations. 
As time went on, many other lobbying groups came on the scene. 
Amongst these was the All-Party Parliamentary Group for European Re-
form, co-founded by MP Andrea Leadsom in 2015 (cf. Parliamentary Regis-
ter of All-Party Groups 2015). She was joined by several Conservative and op-
position MPs (including Frank Field and Gisela Stuart). The group (dedicated 
to reducing regulation of several kinds, including working hours) records in 
the parliamentary register that its aims are: 
to explore each area where EU legislation impacts on the UK 
and assess whether this is better dealt with at the national or 
European level. To work with MEPs, interest groups and other 
experts to explore what a new UK-EU relationship could look 
like and what needs to be done to get there. (ibid.) 
More and more lobby groups tumbled into the open. Hutton (ibid.) lists, in-
ter alia, The Institute for Policy Research, The Stockholm Network, The So-
cial Market Foundation and, importantly, Economists for Free Trade. The 
Home Page of this group records that its members include Patrick Minford, 
its chair, Roger Bootle (advisor to House of Commons Treasury Select Com-
mittee), Warwick Lightfoot, Special Adviser to the Chancellor of the Excheq-
uer between 1989 and 1992, James Dyson, John Longworth (Chair of Leave 
means Leave), Owen Patterson, and Jacob Rees-Mogg. As Minford (2019) ex-
plains, the group believes (to quote one of its pamphlets) that ‘No Deal is the 
Best Deal for the UK’. 
One of the more interesting (for us) lobbying groups is the Legatum In-
stitute. Iain Duncan Smith (IDS), founder of Centre for Social Justice, is a 
Legatum supporter and Hutton (2018) claims that IDS’s approach to poverty 
is basically to encourage people to find work by ensuring that the benefits 
they may claim for being unemployed, sick, disabled, caring for others, and 
so on, are never higher than the wage they would receive if in work. It is 
a view reminiscent of the Poor Law. Hutton (ibid.) argues that, despite ap-
pearances Legatum and the Centre ‘are intended to serve the profiteering of 
multinational busineses’. 
The aim of Part 2 of this article has been twofold. The first has been to 
suggest that the leading Brexiteers are, without apparent exception, enthu-
siastic heirs of the Thatcher project, bearing it ever rightwards. The second 
has been to sketch out a few (there are many more) of the financial winners 
of the Brexit movement.  
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Part 3: Mythologies and iconography
From the rolling out of the Vaken vans to Grenfell, via the Brexit referendum, 
several powerful mythologies have come to be created. Some of those sur-
rounding our events serve to obscure rather than enlighten, to re-arrange 
ethical hierarchies, to privilege the abstract over the concrete in ways we will 
shortly indicate. The mythologies at issue here have appeared either in im-
agery (‘Breaking Point’, for example) or in the oft repeated phrases or texts 
(‘Will of the People’, for example) that have filled columns and airways and 
continue to do so.
Before moving to examples, however, there is an essential question we 
should ask: what are the conditions (social, economic, political) in the con-
temporary world that give rise to the generation of, and belief in, the kind of 
myths we are focusing on here? Hannah Arendt writes in her The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1962 [1951]) that, if society and social structures are broken 
(like those as bruised and fragmented by austerity as those in the UK) and 
citizens have become more or less isolated individuals, then the ground is 
ready for the rise of powerful mythological structures that serve to give us 
what we lack in practice: a sense of purpose and agency even if this is known 
to be imaginary. As Arendt says, totalitarian regimes succeed because iso-
lated, isolated individuals get a ‘sense of having a place in the world’ (ibid.: 
323-4). We have argued above that this sense of place, equating to a sense of 
how home should be, is precisely what many feel has been lost in practice in 
Brexit/Grenfell/Windrush Britain. We may look now at our images and texts.
Breaking point and its predecessors
As noted earlier, ‘Breaking Point’ was the icon of the 2016 referendum cam-
paign. Farage’s poster built on UKIP’s 2016 local election poster of a line of 
people queuing in front of a notice hung in an airport-looking space reading 
‘UK Citizens’. The title of this image was ‘Open door immigration isn’t work-
ing’. The parent/grand parent of these two latter political advertisements was 
the Conservative 1979 election icon of a line of people queuing in front of a 
labour exchange with the title ‘Labour Isn’t Working’, an image credited with 
winning the election for the Conservatives. According to Michael Heseltine’s 
Campaign magazine it was the ‘best poster of the century’ (see Kelly 2015). 
It was the background to Thatcher’s dismissal of the existence of society and 
assertion that ‘there are only individuals and families’. As noted, the UKIP 
promotional brochures at the time of the lead up to the referendum were de-
rivative of those by the extreme conservative right. 
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Banks’s Grenfell
As already noted, Banks launched a photograph of Grenfell Tower at the 
height of the fire (which the Daily Mirror bravely re-published) with the fol-
lowing words superimposed: ‘An amnesty for Grenfell illegal immigrants? 
Absolutely not! The law is the law’ (see Figure 3). Banks’s image could well 
have been the inspiration for an unimaginably and darkly violent ritual in-
carnation carried out in south London of the myth theme he had constructed. 
In November 2018 (around the time of Bonfire Night), party goers built and 
then burned a model of the Grenfell Tower, with brown faces at the windows. 
Video pictures reproduced in newspapers the following day a group of white 
party goers lifting the tower into a bonfire and laughing as it and the models 
inside went up in flames. A George Cross flag appeared in the background. 
A cheer goes up as the model finally falls, burnt out, to the ground. A cos-
mopolitan home is reduced to cinders. One cannot help but be reminded of 
the initial target of those who surrounded Sarajevo at the start of the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely the Sarajevo Library, also the home and stand-
ard bearer of cosmopolitan history and heritage. 
Fig. 4. LEAVE.EU message published on Twitter on 29 March 2018.
Photo: © @LeaveEuOfficial. 
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Banks’s seesaw 
The Independent newspaper re-published another image tweeted by Banks 
in 2018: a seesaw with ‘3 million Muslim votes’ written across one end at 
ground level, and ‘300,000 Jewish Votes’ on the opposite skyward end with 
a text reading ‘Turkeys Don’t Vote for Christmas’ (see Figure 4). The claim 
here was that the Labour Party was solely interested in the votes of ‘Britain’s 
exploding Muslim population’. Amongst those who took exception to this im-
age was the British Board of Jewish Deputies, who reported that some of its 
best allies in the fight against antisemitism are Muslims.
Banks’s seesaw points out several features of the Brexit project which 
permeate its institutional variations. Muslims and Jews are conceptualised 
as having singular and unified identities and dispositions just like two indi-
vidual persons (as children on either ends of a seesaw in the playground). It 
is a step away from claiming that all Muslims, like all Jews, speak with one 
voice. It even implies that members of the Labour party speak with a single 
voice. 
The Will of the People
The term ‘the Will of the People’, sometimes accompanied by the amendment 
‘as expressed in the 2016 referendum’, emerges repetitively in the rhetorical 
pronouncements of Brexiteers. The phrase has the quality of the sacred about 
it, as if it settles an argument rather than opening up a debate. In Brexit 
discussions, the ‘Will’ seems to be challenged only in relation to time. The 
recurring question is asked about whether the ‘Will’ is subject to change or 
whether it is fixed for ever. Yet, very little, if any, talk is heard about what the 
‘Will of the People’ actually means.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of ‘General Will’ (volonté générale) is a 
complex one. This alone makes its simplification in the Brexit debate prob-
lematic or absurd. However, in Rousseau’s thought, there are two particular 
aspects to the idea which are relevant here. First, the formation of ‘General 
Will’ is linked to arguments in political philosophy about the legitimacy of 
government. This is an issue to which various thinkers, including Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke (albeit from different standpoints) gave much time 
and effort. Rousseau (1998 [1762]) himself, in The Social Contract, argued 
that agreement amongst citizens about law and governance derived from un-
derstanding of what was in the ‘common good’ – what was right, just and 
necessary for the wellbeing of the political community as a whole rather than 
the individual. Notions of shared citizenship and collective action are incor-
porated in the idea of ‘common good’. Secondly, therefore, for Rousseau, the 
idea of ‘common good’, and thus of ‘General Will’, come out of a fundamen-
tal attachment (both rational and emotional) to the political community of 
which individuals are a part. 
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In contemporary Britain, unlike in Rousseau’s imagination, the political 
community has been so battered by cuts to social institutions that in many 
ways it has been shorn of any potency it once had. Does a political commu-
nity, in the sense that Rousseau took it to mean, actually exist at a time when 
society itself has been splintered and broken by austerity?
‘Illegal immigrants’
Satbir Singh (2019) has written about the ‘arbitrary cruelty of the govern-
ment’s hostile environment policy’, adding: ‘We all now live under a system 
of Orwellian immigration laws that find people of colour guilty until they 
can prove their innocence’. We now live in a country in which immigration is 
something to be ‘controlled’, ‘brought down’, ‘mitigated’. Immigration, and by 
extension immigrants, are a problem. In the present context, we should add 
that we live in a country in which black British citizens of Caribbean origin 
are called ‘illegal’, are detained, denied healthcare and deported. 
Tie, blazer, pint and forefinger
Farage’s dress codes and stage settings have been of interest for some time 
(Picardie 2015). In the run up and aftermath to the 2019 European elections, 
Nigel has adopted several semiotic dressage markers of note. Whilst simul-
taneously acknowledging that he does not speak French but does ‘know his 
way around a good wine list’, one of his most recent party-political broad-
casts places the familiar pint glass of beer on the table next to him: Nigel 
the nice guy in the pub. Never filmed without a tie, he now routinely sports a 
blazer with bright silver buttons: Nigel the good sport/golf club member. He 
concluded several video broadcasts before the European elections by point-
ing his forefinger at the camera saying that ‘The Brexit Party Needs You’. 
Clearly this is a reference to the iconic poster of Lord Kitchener beckoning 
young men to enlist for the First World War with the call ‘Your Country’s 
Army Needs You’: Nigel the military commander. The BBC (2014) magazine 
commented on the Kitchener poster, observed ‘The authorities anticipated 
that an image of Kitchener - immensely popular with the public and seen as 
a great symbol of army and empire - would be good for recruiting’: Nigel the 
smart symbolist historian. And in one other recent broadcast, wearing what 
appears to be a Piccadilly Field Hat from an established purveyor of gentle-
men’s field accessories, the setting is (of course!) the White Cliffs of Dover: 
Nigel as officer rank defender of the country. In these ways, Nigel presents 
himself as, at once, man of the people, officer, gentleman, possessor of mili-
tary authority and defender of the Brexit faith. Or, as Yasmin Alibhai-Brown 
put it on a recent televised edition of the Jeremy Vine show, ‘racist bounder’.17 
17 Journalist Alibhai-Brown made this remark in April 2019, as part of her con-
tribution to the Jeremy Vine Show on BBC.  
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Fig. 5. ‘Nigel Farage’s battle bus in Birmingham on the pre-referendum tour’, May 2016. 
Photo: © Derek Bennett. 
‘Sovereignty’ and ‘getting our country back’ 
The argument advanced by the Brexiteers is that ‘Brussels’ has taken away 
the ‘sovereignty’ of the UK with the help of regulations and laws generated 
and enforced by the European Commission and the European Court of Jus-
tice. Brexit, it is said, will return agency and autonomy to ‘The British People’. 
But, like the ‘ornamental cookery’ of Barthes (1991 [1957]), this looks and 
tastes good enough yet, also like Barthes’ ‘cookery’, it hides two features of 
Brexit in austerity Britain. One of the most basic means of exercising political 
agency has been all but swept away in the austerity-driven ‘theft’ of municipal 
Britain (see above). We have seen here that all the Brexit-related think tanks 
and institutes, as well as their associated political leaders and followers, have 
lobbied for significantly more deregulation, as well as the removal of rights, 
corporate tax avoidance, and so on. In this context, the idea that Brexit will 
achieve the promised autonomy and sovereignty seems far-fetched.  
Summary
The third part of this article has offered brief reflections on select ‘mytholo-
gies’ associated with our three events. The subject here is not myths-as-lies, 
but myths/mythologies as potentially powerful narratives containing ideas, 
notions and assumptions that mobilise imagination at the same time as ob-
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scuring underlying realities. The notion of ‘Will of the People’, for example, 
obscures the reality that, within collectivities, there are many potentially 
fluid contrasting ideas and values. ‘Illegal immigrants’ as a notion works to 
blind us to the suffering and trauma of people displaced by war. ‘Labour isn’t 
working’ implies unwillingness to work whilst obscuring the downturn, or 
outright disappearance, of many industries in the face of the rise of the gig 
economy. And so on. Mythologies such as these allow us to look the other 
way as members of the ‘Windrush generation’ are imprisoned or deported, to 
brush aside the humanity of those who died in Grenfell and to be caught up in 
a belief that Brexit (which itself has assumed the status of a myth) is going to 
‘Make Britain Great Again’ by way of switching British post-imperial history 
into reverse gear.   
Part 4: Resistance 
Ayesha Hazarika (2018) has referred to a ‘culture war’ in contemporary Brit-
ain, one aspect of which is a conflict between the principles of hospitality and 
hostility. Hazarika links this directly to Brexit. We would wish to extend the 
link to Windrush and Grenfell. To put it more fully, and as we have described 
at some length in this article, the Britain of Brexit, Grenfell, and Windrush 
stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, we have Thatcher’s politico-eco-
nomic project, which, in its mature post-Thatcher form, came to encompass 
our three events. This was made up of absolutist individualism, further and 
faster de-regulation, corporate tax avoidance and the definitive end of any 
kind of ‘Social Chapter’ (that part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty from which 
John Major, then Prime Minister, negotiated a British ‘opt out’) inflamed by 
a rhetoric of hostility towards immigrants. On the other hand, there is con-
siderable and growing evidence of multiple civil society projects celebrating 
hospitality to immigrants, sociability, and the construction of what Mayo and 
Moore (2002) have called ‘the mutual state’, namely a government and public 
sector fully engaged in home making for all.
The relationship between the Brexit related de-regulation project and 
Grenfell may be illustrated with precision by a single anecdote. Days before 
the Grenfell fire, the Red Tape Group of Brexiteer MPs (founders included Ol-
iver Letwin and Gove) was due to discuss what regulations to junk after leav-
ing the EU. One ‘regulatory folly’, EU No. 305/2011, imposed compulsory use 
of construction materials, including external cladding, designed to address 
the spread of fire. Greenpeace wrote of the group, ‘It’s obvious that there are 
powerful political and corporate interests out there, ready to use Brexit as an 
excuse to get rid of vital laws that they see as a hindrance to businesses’ (see 
Laville 2017). The final piece of the jigsaw is thus to ask where and in what 
form resistance to the politics of the past 40 years which has been the found-
ing contexts of our three events in particular, is to be found. For us this lies in 
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de-centralised and geographically wide-ranging co-operation between civil 
society groups and networks under the level of the state actively supported 
and encouraged by the kind of ‘mutual state’ imagined by Mayo and Moore 
(2002). Flora Cornish of LSE, who investigated the process of community-led 
recovery in West London in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower, told me that 
no less than sixty-four civil society groups were formed after the event. These 
range from Justice4Grenfell and the Grenfell Action Group (with its blog) to 
the North Kensington Library (recently saved from closure). Here are point-
ers to a brief selection of others found in the wide field of Grenfell, Windrush, 
and Brexit practices.
At one of the sharpest ends, there is Medical Justice, a small civil soci-
ety group of professional doctors and psychiatrists who provide legal help 
to some of the 30,000 people a year (many with experience of torture, most 
with significant health problems), who are in immigrant detention centres 
and facing the danger of deportation. Their office is located in the same build-
ing used by the Leader of the UK’s largest Opposition party. Then, there is a 
growing number of projects, frequently overseen by civil society groups and 
institutions, aiming to provide safe housing for refugees and asylum seek-
ers. The group Abide, based in Ottery St Mary is, in its own words, ‘devoted 
to converting strangers to neighbours’ by resettling refugee families within 
local communities. 
In a similar vein, Exeter City Council encourages private landlords to 
lease flats to the council, enabling it to house Syrian refugees. This particu-
lar project has provided the space for one such refugee to carve out a life for 
himself and his family. My colleague, Nicola Frost, told me about him and his 
family in detail. Arriving from Syria via Lebanon, their story is marked by 
fear, insecurity and constant uprooting. Nicola added: 
Unable to work until his English skills have improved, he has 
hurled himself at life in Exeter in a way that leaves others full 
of admiration, if slightly breathless. With a new baby at home, 
as well as a boisterous pre-schooler, he volunteers with a com-
munity-based exercise group. He’s also to be found serving free 
food on the street every weekend (he is a fantastic cook, and 
dreams of opening his own restaurant one day) and has even re-
cently turned his hand to hairdressing, giving free cuts to home-
less people alongside the hot meal. He is involved in planning a 
local event celebrating cultural diversity, likes to teach himself 
piano […]. 
This account provides a glimpse into the stories of actual people, stories that 
tend to be obscured by political rhetoric and the enumeration of migrant 
bodies. 
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Then, there is the burgeoning amount of research and development work in 
universities (from Glasgow to Oxford and UCL to SOAS) and other types of 
civil society associations imaginatively concerned with refugee issues. More-
over, in schools, libraries, community centres, within faith communities (‘ref-
ugees welcome’ posters in several of the above in north London, for example) 
and many other public spaces and institutions all over the UK, careful and 
detailed work is taking place to turn us away from siren voices advocating a 
‘hostile environment’ in the name of ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘Brexit’, or what-
ever, towards one based on principles of hospitality. One of the most remark-
able of these spaces is the Lambeth-based Immigration Museum. Working 
with hundreds of school children, university students and members of the 
public, this revolutionary museum expresses and represents migration as a 
homecoming and homemaking to which we are all attached in multiple ways. 
The museum is immersed in stories of immigrants and their experiences.
Daniel Renwick (2018) spoke of the prophesy of the Grenfell Action 
Group Blog months before the fire that only a catastrophe would make those 
in power take proper note of the decrepit state of tower blocks in the bor-
ough of Kensington and Chelsea. Renwick’s view of the fire and its relation to 
Brexit is as follows: 
‘Class contempt, institutional indifference and organised state 
abandonment brought Grenfell into being. And, Brexit is a pro-
ject of deregulation and border regime politics which will make 
a bonfire of European standards and further nudge those in pre-
carity to the margins of British life’. (ibid.)
Home in a ‘post-home’ world   
And what of the notion of home? What lessons can we learn about homemak-
ing and homecoming from Brexit, Grenfell, and Windrush? Here are some 
pointers. 
In this article, we have suggested that home and homemaking need co-
ordinated co-operation at domestic, regional, national and global levels. Such 
de-centralised co-operation is very far from the programme of the Brexit 
funders and their clients. Instead, their project offers cargo cults in which 
‘cheap food, clothes, and footwear’, as Rees-Mogg puts it (see Daly 2018), 
fall from the sky, while they take advantage of a world without rules. They 
invite others to imbibe mythologies about migrants and refugees as sources 
of danger. It is an outlook built on actual and structural hostility bolstered 
by distrust and dislike of the qualities shown by the people of Windrush and 
Grenfell.
Thatcher declared her antagonism to society in 1979. A decade and more 
of austerity since the financial crisis has been a time when the antagonism 
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towards the feckless working class was pursued with literally catastrophic 
consequences as food banks, street sleepers, zero-hour contracts have testi-
fied. Brexiteers have taken up Thatcher’s baton with the aim of constructing 
an atomised, flexible and (as O’Neil’s interlocutor from Wolverhampton said 
so clearly) a profoundly homeless work force. To achieve this, the Brexiteer 
leaders have deployed very powerful myths (in the full classical, as well as 
Barthian senses): ‘getting back control’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘freedom’, ‘independ-
ence’, the slogan of the new Brexit party ‘democracy’, and now ‘liberty’. All 
these have been laced with the Brexiteer leaders’ hostility towards the Win-
drush generation, the cosmopolitan residents of Grenfell, the refugees fleeing 
from war and the EU itself.  
But we have also pointed towards forces on the ground – not least in the 
traumatic spaces surrounding our three events – that speak of emergent con-
viviality, sociability, and the recovery of belief that the means of homemak-
ing and homecoming are on the way to being recovered in our ‘post-home’ 
world. Choice of the direction of travel is in our hands. 
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